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International Criminal Justice: 
Growing Pains 
or Incurable Contradictions?
James von Geldern
I. Introduction
When the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) 
was drafted in 1998, it represented a signal moment in the history of 
human rights. Here, finally, was a document that not only enunciated 
humanitarian protections, it also offered a means to punish individuals 
guilty of violating them. United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan 
called the Statute “a gift of hope to future generations, and a giant step 
forward in the march towards universal human rights and the rule of 
law.” Drafting Committee Chairman Cherif Bassiouni stressed that the 
world would never again be the same. This was the last step of a his-
tory that had started at the end of the First World War and meant that 
impunity for the perpetrators of grave crimes of international concern 
was no longer tolerable. It would not eliminate all conflicts or bring 
victims back to life, but it would bring justice.1
A permanent court to prosecute grave crimes against humanity, 
with jurisdiction over violators powerful and weak, would help create 
a “culture of accountability”; it would serve notice to sovereigns, war-
lords, generals, and soldiers that their actions would be scrutinized by 
the international community and, even if condoned by their compatri-
ots, would be subject to a higher standard: international justice, admin-
istered with an even hand by the international community. As Diane 
Orentlicher, then the U.N. independent expert on combating impu-
nity, reported to the Human Rights Commission in 2005, “Seemingly 
impregnable barriers to prosecution have been dismantled in countries 
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that have endured the depredations of dictatorship; a new breed of 
court, combining national and international elements, has entered the 
lexicon of institutions designed to render justice for atrocious crimes…
Governments and civil society have acquired an expanding repertoire 
of tools for combating impunity.”2
The performance of the International Criminal Court, whose statute 
came into effect in 2002 and which made its first arrest in 2006 and 
initiated its first trial in 2009, has proven a disappointment to many. 
Since 2002, humanitarian abuses have gone on unabated. Conflicts 
continue in Afghanistan and Iraq; Burundi, the Democratic Repub-
lic of Congo and Uganda; Israel and Palestine; the Russian Republic 
of Chechnya; Sudan; Myanmar; and Somalia. These and many oth-
ers flash through the news periodically when another massacre has 
taken place. When peace has lifted its glorious arm, it has often been 
the result of an appalling loss of life, as when the Sri Lankan military 
defeated the Tamil Tigers. In addition, governments no longer have a 
monopoly on violence. Paramilitaries, militant extremists, and even 
criminal organizations commit mass murder in the name of a cause 
or simply for profit. During this time, the ICC has opened a mere five 
cases, has detained five accused criminals, and has brought only one 
case to trial.
It is hard to talk about a culture of accountability or impunity in 
such circumstances. How has the ICC become a device by which pow-
erful states punish their lesser associates while remaining immune to 
its jurisdiction? How is it that the brutal regimes of other states punish 
their opponents without scrutiny of their own actions? Many critics 
point to chief prosecutor Luis Moreno Ocampo. If the ICC is to become 
a reliable tool for fair and equal justice, the prosecutor must operate 
impeccably and even-handedly. Yet even strong supporters of the ICC, 
such as Human Rights Watch, have expressed dismay over Moreno 
Ocampo’s management of his staff, and there are serious allegations 
of misconduct in his own professional and private life.3 More worri-
some are the allegations of politicization. Legally accountable to the 
Assembly of States Parties, and independent of the Security Council, 
the ICC arouses deep suspicions of politicization among a broad range 
of critics. Mahmoud Mamdani accuses the court of being a Western 
puppet and claims that, “the United States used its position as the 
leading power in the Security Council to advance its bid to capture the 
ICC…[This] makes a complete mockery of the ideals that informed the 
setting up of a permanent international criminal court… . ”4 We find 
James von Geldern
83
similar sentiments expressed by Sir Geoffrey Nice, chief prosecutor at 
the International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) 
Milosevic trial: “Domestic courts have governments, democratic par-
liaments and the media supervising them, and barristers and judges 
are very vulnerable to making a big mistake, which can ruin their 
careers. But the UN created this court for political purposes—noth-
ing wrong with that, per se—and then set it loose. That meant that the 
chief prosecutor of the Tribunal has huge powers: ask any government 
for anything, make large claims, get publicity around the world.”5
Yet it might be more useful here to look at the institution itself, the 
Rome Statute that created it, and at the very notion of international 
criminal justice, to see how this situation came about and whether it 
can be remedied. It is not unusual for human rights instruments to 
have little effect at their inception. That does not mean that they are 
useless or empty. It simply means that the mechanisms evolve more 
slowly than the ideals that inspire them. If, as the critics charge, the 
problem with the International Criminal Court lies with its prosecutor, 
this would be good news. Prosecutors can be replaced. What I propose 
to examine is the less optimistic possibility: that international criminal 
justice, itself an infant concept, is so riddled with contradictions, so 
at odds with the foundations of international society, that it is an idea 
with a distant prospect of realization.
II. What is International Justice?
We must first ask ourselves: what is justice? Is it vengeance, righteous 
retribution, deterrence, reconciliation, reparation, or simply a way to 
uncover the truth? In his 1971 publication Theory of Justice, John Rawls 
posited the essential foundations for a just society. For Rawls, “most 
reasonable principles of justice are those everyone would accept and 
agree to from a fair position.”6 This presupposes that all individuals 
and institutions are in a position to assert their notion of what is rea-
sonable and fair, and that they are bound together by a broadly con-
sensual social contract. Rawls does not suppose that all parties to this 
contract will equally enjoy the fruits of a just society, only that they will 
share basic liberties and have access to justice. Justice on a global scale, 
where differences in power render consensus problematic, demands 
that we create institutions whose benefits are available to the least 
advantaged people. Once we have seen to it that global society has 
been organized around a set of fair rules, we can set about freely “play-
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ing the game.” This is not a laissez-faire position. Rawls accounted for 
the contingency that some societies would not adhere to the rules of 
fair play and might violate the rights of their own citizens or behave 
aggressively toward other societies. He termed such societies “outlaw 
states,” as opposed to the well-ordered or decent societies that observe 
the dictates of justice. Quite controversially for the time, he even sug-
gested that violations of rights by outlaw states could legitimate mili-
tary intervention by the well-ordered states.
While in a domestic context we can talk about a social contract and 
suppose that there are reasonable principles of justice acceptable to all, 
the international community is comprised of wholly diverse cultures 
and societies that can agree broadly on some—but not all—principles. 
Systems of government are so disparate that even if societies can agree 
on reasonable principles, not all governments will wish to bind them-
selves to observing them. There are few actions indeed that are so 
heinous as to be universally indefensible, and whose criminality is 
apparent to most, if not all, human beings and societies. These include 
genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes, long accepted by 
custom and treaty to violate international law. Institutions of interna-
tional justice have confined themselves to policing those principles.
The imbalances of power so acute in the international arena have 
given primacy to politics over justice in international affairs. Why 
would a great state surrender the ability to do what it likes simply to 
adhere to rules formulated by others? When, at the dawning of the age 
of the United Nations, Eleanor Roosevelt stated the truism that “Justice 
cannot be for one side alone, but must be for both,” she was also mak-
ing a radical statement that, if implemented, would have threatened 
the international order. A world order in which states surrender their 
political prerogatives—their sovereignty—to the even hand of law has 
taken many years to conceptualize, and is a creation of the post-war era 
of the United Nations. First with the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights in 1948, then with international human rights covenants and 
the humanitarian principles of the Genocide and Geneva Conventions, 
the international community has etched a boundary beyond which its 
members cannot lawfully cross. Until recently, however, there has been 
little progress on holding states and individuals accountable in courts 
of law.
Without a functioning international community, true international 
justice could only remain a dream. Fifteen years ago at this very Inter-
national Roundtable forum, at the dawning of this great experiment, 
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former United Nations Under-Secretary-General Brian Urquhart 
noted, “The reality of the international community is more elusive, 
and never more so than when you consider the basic characteristics of 
a community as normally understood. Taken at their simplest, those 
characteristics are the following: accepted rules of conduct and effec-
tive institutions; common responsibility for all members of the com-
munity; and a shared view of the future.”7 The radical notion that the 
international community should not just enunciate but enforce its rules 
was realized in 1993–1994, as Urquhart spoke, when the International 
Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and Rwanda 
(ICTR) were brought into being. These ad hoc tribunals were the cre-
ation of the Security Council, acting under its Chapter VII powers, and 
the shadow of that supremely political body hung over them from 
the start. The first defendants of the ICTY, shocked to find themselves 
answering to foreigners for actions taken within the borders of their 
homeland in defense of its territorial integrity, protested that the pro-
ceedings were simply a political show trial. The Tribunal dismissed 
the contention. Responding to the objections of Dusko Tadic, a leader 
of the Bosnian Serb militia, that it was meddling in political affairs, the 
Tribunal noted:
The doctrines of ‘political questions’ and ‘non-justiciable disputes’ are 
remnants of the reservations of ‘sovereignty,’ ‘national honor,’ etc. in 
very old arbitration treaties. They have receded from the horizon of 
contemporary international law…The Court has consistently rejected 
this argument as a bar to examining a case. It considered it unfounded 
in law.8
The tribunal was saying, in effect, that sovereignty had become 
obsolete as a concept of international law, and that with its demise 
concern over politicized legal proceedings had disappeared. This was 
a court representing the international community, in fact making the 
vague notion of the international community into a real constituency, 
embodied by a judicial power that could enforce its core prohibitions 
and bring violators to justice.
The International Criminal Court, a child of the United Nations 
but theoretically independent of its politics, was intended to make the 
judicial embodiment of the international community permanent. It 
would reach beyond sovereignty and politics to institute a truly inter-
national justice. But as noted above, equal justice is a radical notion 
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that would demand a reconstitution of the international order. Is the 
very idea of global justice, in particular global criminal justice, pos-
sible? Can we simply embed the “general principles of law recognized 
by civilized nations” in the foundation of the international community 
and expect them to operate as they do in domestic settings? Does the 
nature of justice change when it becomes globalized? From whose 
viewpoint, or what Rawls would call an “original position,” is the 
quality of global justice evaluated and measured? If it is from the point 
of view of the “international community,” what constitutes that com-
munity? Can global justice be equal justice, to which states powerful 
and weak are equally accountable, or will the principle of sovereignty, 
declared obsolete by the ICTY, undermine reciprocity and remain its 
greatest enemy?
For advocates of international justice and human rights, there are 
few words more offensive than sovereignty. Sovereignty would be the 
anachronistic Westphalian principle that allows outlaw governments 
to abuse their own citizens without interference from other states. A 
recent issue of the European Journal of International Law welcomed the 
ousting of sovereignty as the primary principle of international law. 
Such confident statements have been appearing in law journals and 
human rights advocacy reports for at least twenty years. This particular 
article, by Anne Peters, chair of public international and constitutional 
law at the University of Basel, asserts that, “conflicts between state sov-
ereignty and human rights should not be approached in a balancing 
process in which the former is played off against the latter on an equal 
footing, but should be tackled on the basis of a presumption in favor 
of humanity.” While decrying unilateral humanitarian intervention, 
Peters asserts, “the [Security] Council has under very strict conditions 
the duty to authorize proportionate humanitarian action to prevent or 
combat genocide or massive and widespread crimes against humanity. 
The exercise of the veto by a permanent member in such a situation 
should be considered illegal or abusive.”9 Precisely who would make 
this determination is unclear.
Few heads of sovereign states have repeated the sentiment. In fact, 
the roster of sovereign states has experienced one of its most robust 
periods of growth during the last twenty years, as peoples who had 
never achieved statehood attained the dream of self-determination. This 
is the paradox: international justice can only be built at the expense of 
self-determination, which is the first right enshrined in both the ICCPR 
and the ICESCR. Although the principle was conceived as a means 
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to combat colonialism, it was later identified with sovereignty by the 
General Assembly in its 1970 Declaration on Friendly Relations. Nota-
bly, the primary supporters of the Declaration were the small and weak 
states of the Global South, many of which had only recently gained 
sovereignty, and saw it as their greatest defense against the global 
powers. They continue to be the most dogged defenders of the prin-
ciple because their sovereignty is most commonly jeopardized by the 
new world order and the principle of humanitarian intervention. Their 
sovereignty is the capacity that allows them to preserve their traditions 
and unique ways in a globalized world that can seem an unquench-
able engine of homogeneity. Human rights, in their universality, can 
also seem to be an attempt to deprive disadvantaged cultures of their 
singularity. Though created in the spirit and discourse of universalism, 
human rights are perceived by many to have a distinctly Western cast. 
New states emerging from colonialism have signed human rights con-
ventions as part of their project to join the community of nations, but 
they have often done so conscious of signing a document created by 
others, whose universality they must join.
Maintaining a credible impartiality and a commitment to global jus-
tice will be crucial to the future of the ICC. To justify the claim that it is 
humanity’s tribunal, the court must represent the sort of global consen-
sus that would give it the appearance of the rule of law. This has been 
the most telling critique of the court’s detractors. To Mamdani, the 
court represents what he calls “human rights fundamentalists” who, 
working in a legal regime freed of political supervision, will “turn 
the pursuit of justice into revenge-seeking, thereby obstructing the 
search for reconciliation and a durable peace.” The root cause of this 
unfettered zealotry is that the “content of human rights law is defined 
outside a political process—whether democratic or not—that includes 
[victims and perpetrators] as formal participants.”10 Of course, it is 
precisely the liberation from politics that many human rights advo-
cates seek.
The need to maintain the appearance of rule of law has animated 
international criminal tribunals from the start. Robert H. Jackson, 
United States Chief Counsel at Nuremberg, began the prosecution’s 
case with words that still set the standard for international justice:
The privilege of opening the first trial in history for crimes against the 
peace of the world imposes a grave responsibility. The wrongs which 
we seek to condemn and punish have been so calculated, so malignant, 
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and so devastating, that civilization cannot tolerate their being ignored, 
because it cannot survive their being repeated. That four great nations, 
flushed with victory and stung with injury stay the hand of vengeance 
and voluntarily submit their captive enemies to the judgment of the law 
is one of the most significant tributes that Power has ever paid to Rea-
son.”11
The power of these words belies the fact that Nuremberg was nonethe-
less a court of victor’s justice, convened by the victorious powers, con-
ducted under rules of their creation, with jurisdiction over crimes that 
had never before been subject to international criminal responsibility, 
and for which the victorious powers themselves would not face pros-
ecution. Certainly Josif Stalin, whose many crimes included condoning 
the rape and murder of German civilians during the final months of 
the war and afterwards, never answered for his crimes.
Modern supporters of the international tribunals who recognize 
their questionable jurisdiction use similar arguments, sounding as they 
do much like John Rawls. David Luban of Georgetown writes:
[T]he legitimacy of international tribunals comes not from the shaky 
political authority that creates them, but from the manifested fairness of 
their procedures and punishments. Tribunals bootstrap themselves into 
legitimacy by the quality of justice they deliver; their rightness depends 
on their fairness…[I]t is essential that the ICTY, ICTR, and ICC deliver 
champagne-quality due process and fair, humane punishments—which, 
in most respects, they do. Lacking world government to authorize inter-
national tribunals like the ICC, their authority must be largely self-gen-
erated by strict adherence to natural justice.12
One of the primary guarantees of “adherence to natural justice” 
or “fair play” in a domestic context is the delicate balance of govern-
mental powers. The legislature defines crimes and their elements, cre-
ates procedures for adjudication, and defines standards of evidence. 
The executive branch investigates and prosecutes crimes and enforces 
judicial decisions. The independent judiciary adjudicates innocence 
and guilt, and sentences the guilty. At the international level, there is 
no authority that can be compared to a state, no equivalent balance of 
power. Thus upon its creation, the Yugoslav Tribunal was immediately 
subject to charges that it was another example of “victors’ justice.” It 
was essential for the court’s credibility that it be seen as an impartial 
tribunal founded in the rule of law. Faced with the issue of whether it 
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was a court “established by law,” a principle enshrined in Article 14.1 
of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), 
the Tribunal gave an authoritative, if not fully satisfactory, answer:
It is clear that the legislative, executive and judicial division of powers 
which is largely followed in most municipal systems does not apply to 
the international setting nor, more specifically, to the setting of an inter-
national organization such as the United Nations. Among the principal 
organs of the United Nations the divisions between judicial, executive 
and legislative functions are not clear cut. Regarding the judicial func-
tion, the International Court of Justice is clearly the ‘principal judicial 
organ’…There is, however, no legislature, in the technical sense of the 
term, in the United Nations system and, more generally, no Parliament 
in the world community. That is to say, there exists no corporate organ 
formally empowered to enact laws directly binding on international 
legal subjects.13
The Tadic court was conceding that it was not a court established 
by law as traditionally understood. It did not, however, concede that 
it functioned in violation of international human rights. Rather, the 
Court drew a distinction between domestic and international criminal 
law. It noted, “an international criminal court could [not] be set up 
at the mere whim of a group of governments. Such a court ought to 
be rooted in the rule of law and offer all guarantees embodied in the 
relevant international instruments. Then the court may be said to be 
‘established by law.’ ”14
This does not seem to answer the question and there is another inter-
pretation possible here. The ICTY, and its sister court for Rwanda, were 
established by Security Council resolutions. The Security Council can, 
in its various functions, act as a legislature, when it creates a tribunal 
and gives it a statute; as an executive, as it did when it ordered human-
itarian intervention; and even as a judiciary, as it did through the ad 
hoc tribunals. “The [Security] Council, through its resolutions, effec-
tively decides what the law is, not just how to implement it: because it 
requires no other source to validate its legal authority.”15 The absence 
of a balance of powers creates a large potential for conflicts of interest, 
which made it vital that the ad hoc courts maintained the appearance 
of independence from the Security Council and its politics.
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III. The Selection of Cases
The focus on fair procedure ignores the absence of mutuality in ICC 
jurisdiction. Powerful nations, particularly the five powers with the 
veto prerogative on the Security Council, can use the court to bring 
cases against smaller countries. For the United States, Russia, and 
China, which have not ratified the Rome Statute, this means that they 
can refer states to the ICC, regardless of the fact that they themselves 
are not accountable to the Tribunal. Through the Security Council, they 
can even bring before the Court states that have not ratified the Rome 
Statute or accepted ICC jurisdiction. The imbalance of power is written 
into the Rome Statute, albeit in a way that was not immediately visible 
to many states-parties upon signing. The mechanism is the system of 
referrals by which cases are brought to the court, described in Articles 
13–15 of the Statute; those articles that were intended to be the bridge 
that would overcome sovereign immunity and place humanitarian 
protections beyond politics.
Cases can be referred to the court through three procedures: refer-
ral by a state party; referral by the Security Council under its Chapter 
VII powers; and referral proprio motu, on the initiative of the prosecu-
tor, against a state party. The final form of referral, on the initiative the 
prosecutor, caused the greatest contention in the negotiations leading 
up to the signing of the Rome Statute, and the greatest fear of a pros-
ecutor “gone mad with power.” The first cases that came to the pros-
ecutor were by state-party referral. This can be the simplest and least 
contentious form of referral when it is a self-referral, as in the cases 
of Uganda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Although that 
notion might seem paradoxical, it in fact makes sense for states that 
cannot control their own territory against rebel militias.
The first referral came in December 2003 from Ugandan President 
Yoweri Museveni to investigate the activities of the Lord’s Resistance 
Army (LRA). Arrest warrants were issued in 2005 for LRA leader 
Joseph Kony and four of his lieutenants; but the investigation stalled 
because the ICC has no police of its own, and the Ugandans have not 
been able to apprehend Kony. The hunt for Kony took a particularly 
bizarre twist in 2008, when the United Nations sanctioned a covert 
operation to capture or kill him.16 Joseph Kony is surely a vicious and 
murderous insurgent and his ability to elude capture is the source of 
great frustration for officials of the ICC and UN. But for the ICC to rely 
on a “dead-or-alive” military operation to arrest its suspects cannot 
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possibly correspond to any notion of international justice. Yet the oper-
ation was perfectly within the boundaries of the ICC and Rome Stat-
ute. Article 59 of the Statute makes apprehension of the accused solely 
the responsibility of the member states and obliges them to cooperate 
with investigations as fully as possible. The ICC has no judicial review 
of the arrest so states are practically invited to use any means possible 
to deliver the accused to the doorstep of the ICC, where no questions 
will be asked.
Self-referrals can also become a means by which the ICC ceases 
to be an impartial tribunal and becomes a partisan instrument that 
governments use against their opponents and insurgents. Uganda cau-
tiously referred the Lord’s Resistance Army to the prosecutor, whose 
investigation has ignored a catalog of Ugandan government abuses 
that includes, according to the U.S. State Department, “arbitrary and 
politically motivated killings; vigilante killings; politically motivated 
abductions; mob and ethnic violence; torture and abuse of suspects 
and detainees; harsh prison conditions; official impunity; arbitrary and 
politically motivated arrest and detention.”17 Musaveni was able to 
negotiate an advantageous referral with Moreno Ocampo because the 
prosecutor can investigate crimes within the country only with the 
cooperation of the state. As an anonymous employee of the ICC has 
written:
This kind of situation demonstrates how a State can use the Court as part 
of its political strategy, which in this case is essentially internally ori-
ented. Requesting the Court to prosecute crimes committed in northern 
Uganda allowed the government to crystallise the support of the inter-
national community while gaining a legal weapon against the rebels. 
This worked so well that, as of today, (known) arrest warrants have only 
been issued for the rebels even though there is evidence of wrongdoing 
within the Ugandan government’s armed forces. It is up to the Court 
to distance itself from this predictable strategy of States or groups that 
approach the Court. Without this distance, the credibility of the institu-
tion will be damaged.18
The self-referrals of the “situations” in the DRC and Central African 
Republic (CAR) were phrased in ways that would allow the prosecutor 
to investigate and bring charges against both rebels and government, 
but the fact is that cases have been initiated only against rebels. The 
Central African Republic referral resulted in the arrest and detention 
of Jean-Pierre Bemba, and a warrant for the arrest of former presi-
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dent Ange-Félix Patassé. The investigation stemmed from events of 
2002–2003, when Patassé invited the Congolese Bemba to the CAR 
to help put down a coup attempt led by François Bozizé. When the 
Bozizé coup triumphed, Bemba returned to the DRC and Patassé to 
exile in Togo. One of the first actions of the Bozizé government was to 
refer the case to the ICC, whose investigation led to the warrants for 
Bemba and Patassé. No charges or investigation have been launched 
against Bozizé for his actions during the coup or the serious human 
rights and humanitarian failings of his government. He continues to 
rule the CAR, suggesting that the ICC can indeed prove an effective 
tool against political opponents. Although the interests of impartial 
justice would suggest that the prosecutor should evenhandedly inves-
tigate sovereign authority and its opponents, the politics of referral 
militate against this. If it became known that a government referring 
cases against its opponents might soon find itself facing charges, the 
ICC might soon find itself without cases.
This structural bias towards partisanship makes it all the more 
important that the judiciary of the ICC patrol the borders of impartial 
justice. Indeed, there is a good deal of evidence that it has; and it has 
roundly criticized Moreno Ocampo when it has found that he is work-
ing in an unfair and partisan fashion. The partisanship, however, is 
embedded in his operations by the rules of the Rome Statute, not only 
in the rules governing referral, but also in the limits that have been 
placed on his ability to investigate crimes.
The case of Congolese rebel leader Thomas Lubanga Dyilo was 
referred to the ICC by the Congolese government, which arrested him 
in 2006 and transferred him to ICC custody. It has since become a 
focus of attention primarily due to problems in the prosecutor’s con-
duct of this, the first ICC trial. In his preliminary investigation on the 
war crimes charge of recruiting and deploying child soldiers, Moreno 
Ocampo relied on information obtained under confidentiality agree-
ments signed under Article 54(3) of the Rome Statute. Such agree-
ments enable the prosecutor to obtain information from parties who 
must maintain their ability to operate within a war zone, but might 
otherwise become the target of militias or governments if they become 
a source of information—United Nation officials, non-governmental 
humanitarian or human rights organizations, even journalists. Such 
information cannot be used in court, avoiding serious due process 
issues; it can be used “solely for the purpose of generating new evi-
dence.” In other words, the prosecutor is responsible for investigating 
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such leads and generating new evidence that can be used in court. 
Furthermore, he is obliged to share any exculpatory evidence that his 
investigation might reveal. Moreno Ocampo relied heavily on confi-
dential field reports of the U.N. Mission in Congo, but when the court 
ordered him to share the reports with the defense, he refused. In doing 
so, he was respecting the confidentiality agreement he had signed with 
the U.N.—a procedure authorized by Rome Statute Article 54(3). The 
U.N. was adamant that the prosecutor must not disclose the informa-
tion demanded by the Court, placing the prosecutor in an impossible 
position between the U.N. and ICC.19 Ultimately the Trial Chamber 
determined that “the trial process has been ruptured to such a degree 
that it is now impossible to piece together the constituent elements of a 
fair trial,” and ordered Lubanga released.20 This latter catastrophe was 
narrowly averted by an appeal and agreement to share the documents 
with the defense.
Moreno Ocampo was roundly criticized for his actions, although 
they were dictated by the rules of the Court and created under the 
sponsorship of the United Nations. The conflict between the due 
process need to provide the defense with access to evidence, while 
respecting the confidentiality agreements that made it possible for 
the prosecutor to get that evidence, continues. Moreno Ocampo has 
been slow to provide redacted copies of the confidential reports, and 
new allegations have surfaced that his investigators are coaching or 
even bribing witnesses to purport to have been child soldiers. Moreno 
Ocampo has refused to provide the court with the names of his inves-
tigators on the grounds that this would endanger those operating in a 
combat zone. Thus the Court has again ordered Lubanga’s release, on 
the grounds that “an accused cannot be held in preventative custody 
on a speculative basis, namely that at some stage in the future the pro-
ceedings may be resurrected.” In a withering criticism of the prosecu-
tor, the court wrote:
No criminal court can operate on the basis that whenever it makes an 
order in a particular area, it is for the Prosecutor to elect whether or not 
to implement it, depending on his interpretation of his obligations. The 
judges, not the Prosecutor, decide on protective measures during the 
trial, once the Chamber is seized of the relevant issue, as regards victims, 
witnesses and others affected by the work of the Court, and the prosecu-
tion cannot choose to ignore its rulings.21
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Once again, we see how the prosecutor has become the lightning 
rod for criticism, but that his actions are embedded in the protections 
of sovereignty integral to the Rome Statute. The prosecutor must rely 
on organizations that are not subject to ICC jurisdiction to obtain ini-
tial investigatory materials. He must respect their demands for confi-
dentiality, having little to no negotiating leverage behind his requests 
for information. He cannot, under the Statute, use the information in 
building his case for trial. For that, he must rely on the cooperation of 
States-Parties, primarily the state that has been referred to the Court. 
Of course, the state under investigation will be highly cooperative 
when the investigation concerns its opponents and enemies while not 
at all cooperative when the investigation concerns its own crimes.
No method of referral arouses greater fears of prosecutorial power 
than the Article 15 power to open a case on his own initiative, proprio 
motu. This power in fact holds the greatest promise to eliminate the 
culture of impunity and to breach the walls of sovereignty. As has been 
noted widely in the press and scholarship, Article 15 was the most fer-
vently debated provision of the Rome Statute. It allows the prosecutor 
to bypass any sovereign entity or the Security Council to initiate a case 
(although the Security Council can still defer the investigation indefi-
nitely under Article 16). This potentially dangerous and unconstrained 
power is ultimately checked by the provision that an Article 15 inves-
tigation requires the confirmation by a pre-trial chamber that there 
exists a “reasonable basis to proceed with an investigation.”
The prosecutor recently exerted his Article 15 powers for the first 
time to initiate a case for crimes against humanity by the Kenyan gov-
ernment, based on the violence surrounding the 2007 elections. The 
tension between the principles of accountability and sovereignty came 
to the fore in the decision of the Pre-Trial Chamber to allow the inves-
tigation to continue. While there was no doubt that massive violence 
had occurred during the 2007 elections, there was considerable debate 
as to whether the violence constituted a crime against humanity as 
defined under the Rome Statute. Under Article 7, attacks against a 
civilian population must be committed in “furtherance of a State or 
organizational policy.” Chaotic and anarchic violence with multiple 
antecedents, causes, and agents (as occurred in Kenya) might not con-
form to the definition of an “organizational policy.” The majority of 
the Pre-Trial Chamber, while authorizing further investigation, did 
note the lack of clarity of the statute. “Whereas some have argued that 
only State-like organizations may qualify, the Chamber opines that 
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the formal nature of a group and the level of its organization should 
not be the defining criterion. Instead, as others have convincingly put 
forward, a distinction should be drawn on whether a group has the 
capability to perform acts which infringe on basic human values.”22 In 
a spirited dissent, Judge Hans-Peter Kaul went to the heart of the dis-
pute: sovereignty and the institutional capacity of the ICC. He noted 
that, “the general argument that any kind of non-state actors may be 
qualified as an ‘organization’ within the…Statute on the grounds that 
it has the capability to perform acts which infringe on basic human 
values…may expand the concept of crimes against humanity to any 
infringement of human rights.” He asked facetiously, “Would that be 
the case if, for example, the mafia was to commit crimes, be it on a 
large scale, warranting the international community to intervene?” 
Pointing to the greater underlying dangers, he continued:
It is neither appropriate nor possible to examine and explain in this opin-
ion all the potential negative implications and risks of a gradual down-
scaling of crimes against humanity towards serious ordinary crimes… . 
[S]uch an approach might infringe on State sovereignty and the action of 
national courts for crimes which should not be within the ambit of the 
Statute. It would broaden the scope of possible ICC intervention almost 
indefinitely. This might turn the ICC, which is fully dependent on State 
cooperation, into a hopelessly overstretched, inefficient international 
court, with related risks for its standing and credibility.23
This dissent, which could well exert a significant influence on future 
decisions to authorize proprio motu investigations, criticizes the pros-
ecutor for threatening the sovereignty of national legal institutions—
which is precisely the purpose of an Article 15 referral.
IV. The Role of the Security Council
Although the prosecutorial referrals aroused the greatest controversy 
among the most powerful parties negotiating the Rome Statute, it is 
the Security Council referrals that provoke the wrath of the weaker 
states of the world, once the greatest supporters of the ICC. These 
referrals are a grave danger to the legitimacy of the ICC. The recent 
Security Council referral of the situation in Darfur has brought these 
fears to the foreground. Again here, the court’s most strident critics are 
perhaps the most accurate as well. As Mamdani writes:
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If the ICC is accountable, it is to the Security Council, not the Gen-
eral Assembly. It is this relationship that India objected to when it—like 
the United States, China and Sudan—refused to sign the Rome Statute. 
India’s primary objection was… that ‘granting powers to the Security 
Council to refer cases to the ICC, or to block them, was unacceptable, 
especially if its members were not all signatories to the treaty, for it ‘pro-
vided escape routes for those accused of serious crimes but with clout in 
the U.N. body.’ At the same time, ‘giving the Security Council power to 
refer cases from a nonsignatory country to the ICC was against the Law 
of Treaties under which no country can be bound by the provisions of a 
treaty it has not signed.’24
Article 14(b) of the Statute allows for referrals “by the Security Coun-
cil acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations.” The 
Article is silent as to whether the state referred to the ICC must have 
ratified the Rome Statute. Thus there was a great deal of surprise and 
outrage in March 2009 when the Court issued an arrest warrant for 
Omar al-Bashir, President of Sudan, which is not party to the Rome 
Statute. The case went to the ICC on a Security Council referral. Using 
the same logic that it had used with the former Yugoslavia, the Council 
declared the Darfur situation to be a threat to international peace and 
security because of the refugee crisis it had precipitated in Chad.25 This 
placed the situation under the Chapter VII jurisdiction of the Council, 
which then referred the case to the ICC in its Resolution 1593. The 
Resolution also obliged Sudan to cooperate with the prosecution and 
Court in its investigations, and created similar obligations for other 
non-states-parties.
A Chapter VII Security Council referral, which can be directed at 
any state, including non-states parties, would seem to violate a long-
standing principle of international law that no state can be held to a 
treaty to which it did not agree.26 Article 13(b) of the Rome Statute does 
not specify whether Security Council referrals can be directed at non-
signatory states. However, since the creation of the Yugoslav Tribunal 
in 1993, it has been an acknowledged principle of international law 
that, under Chapter VII, the Security Council can bring sovereign lead-
ers without their consent before a criminal tribunal for grave crimes 
against humanity and international peace. Sudan is a member of the 
U.N. and has signed the Charter; it is subject to the Chapter VII pow-
ers of the Security Council. Thus it is a settled matter that the Security 
Council can bring the Sudanese leadership before a criminal tribunal 
for judgments of individual responsibility. It is not settled that this tri-
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bunal can be the ICC, or that the rules under which these cases will be 
tried are the rules of the Rome Statute.
The most troubling conflict of rules concerns whether other states 
must honor the arrest warrant against al-Bashir, which would violate 
longstanding international laws concerning the immunity of heads 
of state from arrest. While Article 27(1) of the Rome Statute lifts the 
shield of immunity from heads of states and allows for the lawful issue 
of an arrest warrant, Article 98(1) partially reaffirms the immunity by 
requiring the Court to obtain the cooperation of third-party states for 
the waiver of the immunity. Thus even if Resolution 1593 places all 
states under the obligation to cooperate with the ICC in its pursuit of 
al-Bashir, it is not at all clear that that these states are obliged to arrest 
and hand him over to the court. A spirited scholarly debate on this 
issue has ensued, showing a split between those who believe that it 
would be unlawful to arrest and surrender al-Bashir to the ICC versus 
those who believe that the Security Council Resolution, which itself 
creates international law, has also created an obligation to surrender 
the Sudanese president if captured.27
The provision for Security Council referrals against non-party states 
creates in essence two classes of sovereign states. Rather than the divi-
sion that the Rome Statute would seem to create (non-states parties, 
over whom the court has no jurisdiction, and States-Parties, who have 
ceded jurisdiction to the Court for certain crimes committed against 
them or by them), Article 13(b) referrals divide states, whether parties 
to the Statute or not, that are subject to the jurisdiction of the Court on 
condition of referral from those powerful states that have not ratified 
the Statute and whose veto powers in the Security Council render them 
immune from the reach of the court. These states include not only the 
United States, Russia, and China, but they also include any non-signa-
tory allies that those powers might choose to protect from the Court.
Thus one of the primary features of justice, reciprocity, is absent 
from international criminal justice, and it does not seem likely to 
become part of the system in the foreseeable future. When Gary Bass 
writes, “it is victory that makes justice possible but the fairness of the 
process is what makes it justice,” he ignores the lack of reciprocity 
embedded in the structure of international justice.28 Weak states that 
are subject to international justice have no way to bring powerful states 
to justice. They can be punished, but they do not receive protection in 
return. While we can blame this on the prosecutor, who has elected to 
focus on African cases in the early years of the court, we must note that 
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the inequity is written into the Rome Statute and could well become a 
permanent feature of its justice. Even the elaborate powers of oversight 
given to the Pre-Trial Chambers of the ICC cannot act as a counter-
balance. The Chambers have the power to block cases, but they do 
not have power to demand cases be brought that would equalize the 
power differential.
These considerations will determine the perceived legitimacy of the 
ICC as a court of international justice, and have already led to a serious 
decline of the Court’s credibility. Although African states were once the 
strongest supporters of the ICC, they are having second thoughts. The 
cases against al-Bashir in Sudan, Bemba in the Central African Repub-
lic, and now the Kenyan case have aroused concerns that the court has 
been turned into a selective political instrument. Libyan leader Muam-
mar Gaddafi has called the ICC a politicized tribunal that will allow 
the West “to recolonise their former colonies.”29 Al-Bashir attracts con-
siderable sympathy in his homeland and the continent when he claims, 
“We have refused to kneel to colonialism…That is why Sudan has been 
targeted…because we only kneel to God.”30 His accusation that the 
ICC is acting as a tool of Western colonialists who are after Sudan’s oil 
reserves strikes a familiar chord. The Assembly of the African Union 
has adopted a resolution not to cooperate with the ICC investigation or 
to honor the arrest warrant for al-Bashir. Much to the embarrassment 
of the ICC, the Sudanese president has been able to travel throughout 
Africa to countries that have elected not to honor the warrant.
V. Conclusion
When the Rome Statute was signed, the then-Foreign Minister of Italy, 
Lamberto Dini, said the Statute of the Court introduced radically 
important innovations into relations between States, affecting their 
sovereign prerogatives, and establishing a new relationship between 
the national courts and international jurisdiction.31 Yet such euphoria 
is, at best, premature. While we can all acknowledge the benefits of 
removing mass murderers and the perpetrators of unspeakable crimes 
from the international community, we should be cautious about speak-
ing of international justice just yet. Justice, as Rawls reminds us, is 
founded on fair play. The ICC has the power to make previously sov-
ereign powers outlaws, placing them outside the protections of inter-
national law. Yet we must also note another class of outlaw—those 
powerful states that have not deigned to subject themselves to this new 
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form of international law. They do not enjoy the protections offered by 
the ICC, but they probably do not need them, sheltered by their own 
political and military might.
To repeat a thought with which this essay began, international 
human rights and humanitarian law have always begun as an aspira-
tion rather than an enforceable reality. Certainly this has been the case 
with international criminal justice. The hope is always that a declara-
tion or convention will serve to raise consciousness amongst states that 
they are responsible for their people, and among citizens that they have 
rights that nobody can take from them without the protection of law. 
The concern here is that a promising body such as the ICC, deprived 
of the mechanisms to fulfill its promise, will become politicized and a 
source of cynicism, much like the U.N. Human Rights Council. In any 
event, talk of international justice is premature. If there is a rule of law, 
it is a rule of law that applies to some, and a rule of law that will out-
law some bad people. But it will not apply to all.
To repeat the other thought that began this essay: This does not 
mean that international criminal justice is empty or useless. It asserts 
that there is a growing consensus within the international community 
that humanitarian principles are more important than sovereignty. It 
provides names and definitions for those crimes that place states and 
their powerful leaders outside the boundaries of the law. It will create 
records of atrocities that would otherwise have passed out of history 
unnoted, and will develop a body of case law that helps us understand 
precisely when sovereign actions become unacceptable. For many of 
the powerful nations that have exempted themselves from the jurisdic-
tion of the court, it alerts them that they should follow its rules. Since 
the truest way to avoid the arm of the International Criminal Court is 
to bring one’s own citizens before a domestic court for their crimes, a 
nonparty state can, in fact, adhere to the letter and spirit of the Rome 
Statute without ever ratifying it. There is significant evidence that the 
Statute has already had this effect. Perhaps party and nonparty states, 
knowing that they will be shamed before the international community 
if they do not police their own crimes, will be more likely in the future 
to empower their judiciaries to punish their own criminals. If so, then 
we might find that international justice will come into being at pre-
cisely the moment it is no longer needed. •
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